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Do MARKETS WORK BETTER THAN LEGAL RESTRAINTS?
A RESPONSE TO CLAYTON GILLETTE'S "FISCAL HOME
RULE"
PAUL DILLERt

Professor Clayton Gillette takes a dim view of state-imposed limitations on municipal taxing and borrowing authority. While recognizing
their poor performance of late,1 Gillette concludes that "markets," however imperfect, are likely to work better than "artificial" legal restraints
at ensuring the fiscal health of local governments. Gillette's preference
for markets over legal restrictions may strike the reader as a curious one
given recent economic events. With the bust of the housing bubble, the
subprime mortgage meltdown, and the collapse of once-venerable Wall
Street firms, the American public and its elected leaders have increasingly embraced government intervention in the marketplace. Why, then,
does Professor Gillette maintain his faith in markets as the best tool for
preventing the abuse of municipal fiscal authority?
Part of the reason Professor Gillette prefers "markets" is because he
uses that term broadly to include the Tieboutian market for residents and
business owners. Gillette believes that this market, which bears little
resemblance to the financial markets that have foundered in recent
months, more effectively prevents local officials from imposing excessive taxes than constitutional limitations on municipal taxation. 4 Gillette's reliance on the Tiebout theory in criticizing hard limits on municipal taxation authority seems reasonable, although as Gillette recognizes,
the theory's value as a descriptor of urban dynamics is significantly limited by its heroic assumptions. 5
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1. Clayton P. Gillette, FiscalHome Rule, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1241, 1259 (2009). See also
Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction-StructuredFinance and Credit Market Reform in the
Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 53 (2009); Jon Meacham & Evan Thomas, We Are All Socialists
Now, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16, 2009, at 23.
2.
Gillette, supra note 1, at 1248, 1259.
3.
See Meacham & Thomas supra note 1, at 23; David E. Sanger, Selling a New Deal, but
Promising it Will be Brief, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2009, available at http:llwww.nytimes.comV2009/
02/25/us/politics/24web-sanger.html.
4.
Gillette, supra note 1, at 1255.
5.
Id. at 1243; see also Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 26 n.8 (1998)
(citing Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956);
Wallace E. Oates, On Local Financeand the Tiebout Momdel, 71 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROc.
93, 93 (1981); Lyke Thompson, Citizen Attitudes About Service Delivery Models, 19 J. URB. AFF.
291 (1997)).
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Not all cities are restrained by taxation limits that are as "blunt and
inflexible" as those on which Gillette focuses his criticism. 6 In some
states, limits on revenue-raising authority may be circumvented by popular vote while in other states, the state constitution limits only certain
types of taxation. By allowing voters and municipal officials some flexibility in determining revenue, these softer restraints may offer an alternative to the hard limits that Gillette dislikes and the crudely functioning
Tieboutian "market" that he prefers. Rather than leaving elected officials
to guess what level of taxation is likely to be so excessive as to spur an
exodus of residents and business owners, soft restrictions allow voters to
register their preferences for taxation levels through democratic means.
As I will explain, however, these evadable revenue-raising restrictions
have proved surprisingly sticky. This stickiness suggests that even limitations less rigid than those criticized by Gillette may have an appreciable impact on voters' preferences for taxation and, therefore, the ability
of local governments to raise revenue.
In arguing against municipal debt limitations, Professor Gillette relies more on conventional market mechanisms like the financial institutions-including banks and rating agencies-that have performed so
poorly of late. Gillette believes that these institutions will better restrain
municipalities from excessive risk-taking than legal debt restrictions.
Although there are salient differences between the market for municipal
debt and the markets for mortgages and mortgage-backed securities that
have recently imploded, one hesitates to share Gillette's faith in the very
ratings agencies and bond trading houses that have contributed to the
nation's economic pain of late.7 On the other hand, Gillette rightly identifies these actors as potential providers of information useful to voters
seeking to monitor elected officials' behavior. To that end, in the context
of debt limitations, particularly when they-like tax limitations--can be
circumvented by public vote, market forces can work in conjunction with
the plebiscite to restrain excessive borrowing by public officials.
I. LIMITATIONS ON TAXATION

Gillette assesses the constitutional restrictions many states have imposed on property tax rates as "blunt" instruments, and in some states
they are, severely constraining local governments' ability to raise revenue. 8 In other states, however, constitutional provisions impose softer
limitations on local taxing authority. In California, for instance, Proposition 13 has severely constrained cities' ability to raise revenue through

6.
Gillette, supra note 1, at 1261.
7.
Gretchen Morgenson, Debt Watchdogs: Tamed or Caught Napping?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2008, at Al.
8. Gillette, supra note 1, at 1253.
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taxes on real property. 9 California cities, however, are free, with voter
approval, to raise the sales tax beyond the state level and keep the incremental amount collected to fund local services.1 0 In Oregon, a series of
state constitutional amendments adopted by popular vote in the 1990s
limited the ability of local governments to raise revenue through property
taxes." The voters in Oregon cities and counties can approve the circumvention of these limits, however, by passing a "local option levy" to
raise
funds
for local
Moreover,
Oregon cities 3remain additional
free to impose
income
and services.
sales taxes2 within
their jurisdictions.1
Softer state constitutional restraints like Oregon's and California's
represent something of a hybrid between the hard limits imposed by state
constitutions, which Gillette dislikes, and a system that relies solely on
market-based constraints, which Gillette prefers. In contrast to marketbased restrictions, soft limitations rely to some degree on residents expressing their preference for taxes and services by voting with their ballots rather than only with their feet. Because "consumer-voters," particularly residents, are not as mobile as the Tiebout theory assumes, softer
limitations may better elicit voter preferences than the functioning of the
Tieboutian market envisioned by Gillette. 14 Soft limitations also may
reflect a judgment that the expression of residents'
preferences through
"voice" rather than "exit" has its own value.15
But just how soft are soft limitations on local revenue-raising authority? In states like California, allowing cities to adopt incremental
sales taxes clearly does not fully compensate for cities' constricted ability to tax real property in a post-Proposition 13 regime. Voters in California cities can opt for a higher municipal revenue stream, but only in a
manner they might consider less favorable than increased property taxes.
Moreover, voters who might otherwise prefer a higher-tax, more-services
mix may nonetheless vote against a sales tax increase because they fear,
with some good reason, that the increase will drive away businesses

9.

CAL. CONST. art. XIII.A; see generally ARTHUR O'SULLIVAN ET AL., PROPERTY TAXES

AND TAX REVOLTS: THE LEGACY OF PROPOSITION 13 (1995).

10. Coleman v. County of Santa Clara, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Neecke v.
City of Mill Valley, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 266 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). In those cities or counties that do not
adopt a higher sales tax, state law already allocates a one-percent increment out of the state-imposed
sales tax of approximately seven or eight percent to local governments. See PAUL GEORGE LEWIS &
ELISA BARBOUR, CALIFORNIA CITIES AND THE LOCAL SALES TAX 5 (1999).
11.
In particular, Ballot Measures 5, 47, and 50, passed in 1990, 1996, and 1997, respectively,

limited the ability of local governments to raise revenue through the property tax. See Paul DiUller,
The Partly Fulfilled Promiseof Home Rule in Oregon, 87 OR. L. REv. 939, 970-71 (2009); David H.
Angeli, The Oregon Legislature's Constitutional Obligation to Provide an Adequate System of
Public Education: Moving from Bold Rhetoric to Effective Action, 42 WILLAMETrE. L. REv. 489,

493 (2006).
12.
13.

OR. REV. STAT. § 280.060 (2007).
Diller, supra note 11, at 971.

14.

E.g., Frug, supra note 5, at 26.

15.

ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
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(who are more likely to vote with their feet than residents). 16 Voters who
prefer higher taxes and more services might also vote against a sales tax
increase because they fear, with some justification, that it will distort the
city's approach to land use: the more reliant the city becomes on sales
taxes, the more likely it will adopt a zoning code that favors retail sales,
accelerating strip mall development and suburban sprawl. 17 California's
soft limitation, therefore, has hard consequences on the menu of choices
available to voters.
In states like Oregon that have property tax limitations that can be
circumvented to some degree by popular vote,18 the soft limitations imposed by state law have proved surprisingly sticky. On the surface, the
availability of the "local option levy" to communities preferring a highertax, more-services mix allows residents a democratic vehicle through
which to express their preferences. In practice, however, cities and counties have found it difficult to pass local option levies, with the success
rate of those placed on the ballot only about thirty-three percent. 19
Moreover, this thirty-three percent "success" rate relies on a denominator
that excludes many revenue-raising proposals floated publicly by local
officials but ultimately not placed on the ballot because public opinion
polls indicated that they were likely to fail. 20 The reluctance of Oregon
voters to adopt local option levies may accurately represent local voter
preferences. On the other hand, the requirement of voter approval for a
local option levy and the establishment of a state-imposed default taxation baseline likely have an effect on resident preferences for taxes and
services. In other words, voters' preferences for tax-service packages are
not necessarily stable and are not determined independent of the manner
in which the preferences are expressed.
In Oregon, for instance, prior to the state's soft constitutional limitations, local officials could increase the property tax rate without voter
approval. 21 The subsequent statewide adoption of a constitutional limita16. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part l1-Localism andLegal Theory, 90 COLuM. L. REV.
346,421 (1990).
17.
See generally LEWIS & BARBOUR, supra note 10; Jonathan Schwartz, Note, Prisonersof
Proposition 13: Sales Taxes, Property Taxes, and the Fiscalizationof Municipal Land Use Decisions, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 183 (1997).
18.
Oregon voters may not circumvent the constitution's limitations on the valuation of real
property for taxation, OREGON CONST. art. XI § 11(2), but they may vote to increase the tax rate on
assessed property in the taxing district for up to five years or ten years for capital projects. ld. §
1 (4)(a)(A).
19. See Oregon State Univ. Media Release, OSU Study: County Budget Crisis to Have Impact on Roads, Law Enforcement, July 9, 2008, http://oregonstate.edu/dept/ncs/
newsarch/2008/JuI08/Roads.html.
20. E.g., Mark Larabee, Portland Voters Won't See Road-Repair Fee Hike on Ballot,
OREGONIAN, July 25, 2008, at B2 (explaining how Portland council member decided not to refer
gas-tax hike to voters because polling indicated the increase would not pass).
21.
E.g., Fran Gardner, School Board Approves $310 Million Budget, OREGONIAN, Apr. 27,
1989, at C2 (discussing Portland School Board vote increasing "tax rate for the district [from
$16.08] to $16.71 per $1,000 assessed valuation").
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tion on property taxes, even if soft, however, may have framed voters'
views as to what is the appropriate
level of taxation by establishing a
S• 22
baseline that voters privilege. When city officials seek to raise revenue
beyond the baseline, an "endowment effect" may cause voters to see this
increased taxation as a loss they would not feel had state law not established a baseline.2 3 Moreover, subjecting property tax increases to a local plebiscite may cause voters to focus on the loss of the extra property
tax more than if it were simply enacted by a majority vote of the city
council or board of education. By making property tax increases the
subject of an up-or-down plebiscite, a local option levy increases the
justificatory burden on local officials who support the measure. As a
result, in states like Oregon, local officials must engage in extensive
campaigns to "sell" voters on why the increased property tax is meritorious. 24 In sum, although they might seem like a way in which community preferences for taxation can be elicited, even soft revenue-raising limitations prove somewhat hard by changing those preferences themselves.
II.DEBT LIMITATIONS

In the context of debt limitations, Professor Gillette's reliance on financial markets and institutions as a restraining force is somewhat questionable in light of their recent performance. On the other hand, Professor Gillette acknowledges that he does not expect these markets to be the
only force restraining excessive borrowing by municipal officials even in
the absence of hard constitutional limitations. Rather, Gillette sees the
financial markets as providing information for voters to use in monitoring the actions of their local officials. Nonetheless, Gillette argues that
financial markets and the interest rates they produce will likely provide
the main check on excessive borrowing by local authorities.
Gillette acknowledges that constitutional municipal debt restrictions
are not always "hard." Rather, many of the limits can be evaded if debt
can legally be classified as a certain type. Gillette frowns on some of the
more recent "[m]achinations for circumventing debt limits," such as
"moral obligation" bonds,25 the combined use of which can make it hard22. See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 PSYCHOL PUB.
POL'Y & L. 106, 108 (2006) [hereinafter McCaffery & Barron, PSYCHOL.] (citing I.P. Levin et al.,
All FramesAre Not Created Equal, A Typology and CriticalAnalysis of Framing Effects, 76 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 149 (1998); A. Tversky & D. Kahneman, The Framing of
Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 185 SCiENCE 453, 453-58 (1981); A. Tversky & D.
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framingof Decisions, 59 J. Bus. 151, 151-78 (1986)); see also
Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The PoliticalPsychology of Redistribution, 52 UCLA L
REV. 1745, 1774 (2005) [hereinafter McCaffery & Baron, UCLA].
23. See McCaffery & Baron, PSYCHOL, supra note 22, at 108-09; see generally Rossell
Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003).
24. E.g., Jennifer Anderson, Portland Public Schools Parents Mobilize Levy Campaign,
PORTLAND TRiB., Sept. 15, 2006 (describing campaign to convince voters to approve local option
levy for Portland schools), available at http://www.portlandtribune.com/news/story.php?story_id=l
15828679645386300.
25. Gillette, supra note 1, at 1256.
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er for voters to know the locality's "true debt position."2 6 Gillette briefly
acknowledges another major way in which debt limitations are soft: in
many states, they may be overridden by a majority-or sometimes supermajority-vote of residents. 27
As in the case of tax limitations, soft debt limitations may affect
voters' preferences rather than simply provide a vehicle through which
those preferences can be expressed. By setting a particular level of indebtedness as a ceiling beyond which the city needs a majority vote to
exceed, these systems may cause voters to privilege the preset ceiling
more than they would if the city's debt level were being established
anew, or if the city's level of indebtedness were determined by an elected
council. 28 Because the costs of increased indebtedness are not immediately felt by voting residents in the same way that tax increases are,
however, any "endowment effect" created by the state-imposed soft limits may be smaller than in the tax context. 29 Regardless, similar to soft
tax limitations, soft debt limitations likely increase the justificatory burden on local officials seeking to increase municipal debt.30
Soft debt limits also present an ostensible alternative to the Tieboutian model by allowing voters to express their preferences through the
ballot box rather than only via exit. Given that voters are likely to have
very little conception of what a good level of indebtedness is for the city,
they are likely to approve or not approve circumvention of a soft debt
limit more on the basis of the perceived merits of the particular projects
for which the extra debt will pay, rather than on some detached assessment of the city's credit position. In this sense, soft debt limitations can
serve as a vehicle through which voters express their opinion of city leadership and its preferred projects, a signal which may be useful to local
officials concerned about voter preferences.31
CONCLUSION

Overall, Gillette is right to doubt the utility of constitutional taxation and debt limitations. While in their softer forms these restraints
seemingly allow more democratic input from voters, in doing so, as I
have attempted to illustrate here, the limitations may affect the preferences of the voters. Exactly what the voters' "true" preferences for taxation and debt levels are is an issue that cannot be determined independent of the manner in which those preferences are elicited. Hence, while
26. Id. at 1257.
27. Id. at 1258.
28. McCaffery & Baron, UCLA, supra note 22, at 1774.
29. Id. at 1774-75 (observing that people are likely to discount the future costs of current
deficits).
30. E.g., Kimberly Melton, Maintenance To-do List Requires Bonds-Mt. Hood Community
College Bond Issue, OREGONIAN, Oct. 19, 2006, at Metro East Neighbors 1.
31.
Cf McCaffery & Baron, PSYCHOL, supra note 22, at 118.
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Gillette is right that state-imposed hard limitations on local revenueraising and debt-incurring authority "artificially" constrain voters' ability
to select the level of taxation and debt that they consider optimal, even
softer limits likely affect voters' preferences. Whether this phenomenon
is salutary depends on considerations beyond the scope of this paper,
such as the importance of the programs a city may not be able to afford
once its residents' taxation preferences have been framed by soft limits,
and, on the other hand, the value of allowing residents to participate directly in municipal fiscal decisions.

